
The recent conflict involving Iran has laid bare the steep price and imperfect performance of modern air defence systems. According to a new analysis by Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, the financial burden of deploying and maintaining these systems was immense, yet their operational success was far from guaranteed. The report suggests that even advanced interceptors struggled against saturation attacks and evolving missile threats.
For European policymakers, the takeaway is uncomfortable: the assumptions underpinning their own air defence strategies may no longer hold. The conflict demonstrated that defending against a determined adversary requires not just more systems, but smarter integration and a willingness to accept higher costs per interception.
The Iranian campaign showcased both the strengths and vulnerabilities of layered air defence. Interceptors like the Patriot and David's Sling achieved notable kills, but at a cost that raises questions about sustainability in a prolonged war. Reports indicate that the sheer volume of incoming drones and missiles overwhelmed some batteries, forcing commanders to prioritise targets and accept leaks.
More troubling, the analysis points to a failure rate that, while classified, is described as significant. This has implications for NATO's eastern flank, where member states have invested heavily in systems like the Patriot and SAMP/T. If these systems cannot guarantee protection, the credibility of deterrence is weakened.
Europe now faces a stark choice: increase defence spending dramatically or rethink its approach to air defence. The Bruegel report calculates that fully protecting key cities and infrastructure would require expenditures in the tens of billions of euros annually—a figure that strains national budgets already stretched by energy and social costs.
Alternative strategies, such as relying on offensive strikes to pre-empt missile launches or developing cheaper interceptors, are gaining traction. However, these come with their own risks, including escalation and reduced reaction time. The report argues for a hybrid approach: investing in high-end systems for critical assets while accepting lower protection for less vital areas.
The conflict has also highlighted the importance of interoperability. European nations operate a patchwork of systems from different manufacturers, often with incompatible data links. This proved a liability in the Iran theatre, where coordination between allied forces was hampered by technical barriers.
Bruegel urges a European-wide air defence network, akin to the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, but with a stronger emphasis on shared procurement and joint exercises. Without such integration, the report warns, Europe risks paying more for less effective protection.
As European governments review their defence budgets, the lessons from Iran will weigh heavily. The war has shown that air defence is not a one-time purchase but a continuous commitment to training, maintenance, and upgrades. The next few months will be critical as NATO defence ministers meet to discuss capability targets.
Expect debates over funding mechanisms, with some pushing for joint EU bonds to finance defence projects. The outcome will shape not only Europe's security posture but also its relationship with the United States, which has long shouldered the air defence burden for the continent.
For now, the message from Bruegel is clear: Europe cannot afford to ignore the costs and failures exposed in Iran. The time to act is before the next conflict, not after.